Defence

David Miliband, the UK foreign secretary has backed French plans to enhance European defence arguing that these were not incompatible with NATO membership but rather complimentary. Mr Miliband insisted that NATO would remain the “cornerstone of European defence,” and that plans to boost European defence did not amount to the creation of a European army. France has made this one of the priorities of its presidency and needed the support of the UK, the other European military heavyweight. France and the UK share the belief that the EU needs to strengthen its ability to use hard power and play a bigger role in crisis management.

Nicolas Sarkozy is on his way to Ireland. On 11 July the hyperactive French President will land in Dublin on his first visit to a EU member country after taking over the rotating Presidency of the Union. The agenda of the meeting consists of one issue. Mr. Sarkozy is to discuss the Irish no to the Lisbon-treaty with his Irish colleague, Prime Minister Brian Cowen. One can, however, not help fearing that Mr. Sarkozy in his usual style will accidentally let a word or two slip on the Irish situation and make a politically complicated situation even more delicate.

Those were the words of Georgian Foreign Minister David Bakradze as the rhetorics were stepped up in the wake of the 2-4 April NATO meeting in Bucharest, Romania. Georgia and Ukraine are eager to receive approval for their membership action plans. The US, Poland and other Eastern member states are pushing for recognition of the membership bids of the former Soviet states. An alliance of Germany, France, Spain, Italy and other West-European countries are, however, opposed to granting candidate status to Georgia and Ukraine. Russia has expressed its outright opposition to seeing more of its neighbours joining the military organisation and the West-European states seem eager to avoid another showdown with Russia on words. Instead they opt for a more consensual strategy out of a fear of annihilating Russia even more. The question is which of the two approaches is the best strategy.

The change of government in Poland in November 2007 continues to bring good news. Last week saw Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stating that Poland was in no rush to set up the US missile shield that, according to the US administration, should protect the US and Europe from rogue states such as Iran. Plans that have provoked heavy protests from Russia. Mr. Tusk was supplemented by his Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, saying that Poland is not feeling itself threatened by Iran. Indeed, different words than the discourse that could be heard in pre-November 2007 Poland, when the last name of the Polish PM was Kaczynski. Seen from the other side of the Atlantic the new Polish approach is yet another example of US President George Bush’ increasing status as a lame duck. As the presidentials are approaching Mr. Bush founds himself being a President without much power. In this case, with EU-Russia relations soaring over a number of issues, the new foreign policy signals from Poland are good news.

There is more bad news from Russia. The week saw Russia announce that it will withdraw its participation from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty which restricts the number of weapons of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The reason outlined by Mr. Putin is the “muscle-flexing” of the NATO with which the Russian president referred to US plans to construct a missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. With words reminiscent of the good old Cold War, Mr. Putin retaliated that he had asked the strategic nuclear forces of Russia “to raise their combat readiness”. Regardless whether one sympathizes with the Russian criticisms of the plans of a missile defence system, it is preoccupying to observe an increasingly authoritarian Russia in the hands of Mr. Putin, and older generations feeling one step closer to what they thought were the long gone years of the Cold War.

UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband was unmistakably clear when he spoke about enlargement as a tool to ensuring stability and reform in countries adjacent to Europe. “The more the marrier” seemed to be the view on enlargement that was expressed in Mr. Miliband’s speech on the global challenges facing the European Union, delivered at the College of Europe in Bruges. While the prospect of enlargement has unquestionably been the strongest single foreign policy tool of the EU when it comes to the Union’s neighbouring countries, Mr. Miliband’s view on enlargement seems to conflict with his wish to see the Union making a difference across its borders. Whereas EU enlargements traditionally have been followed by a deepening of the Union’s competences and institutional decision making capacity in numerous internal policy issues, the EU still fails to give strong answers to foreign policy questions. Enlarging the Union might be a worthy effort for many reasons. But without institutional reforms another enlargement is not going to make the formulation of a coherent EU foreign policy an easier task.