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Add a commentIn those countries – after a few years of painful adjustment – queues, empty shelves and stifled entrepreneurial spirits gave way to choice, quality goods, business opportunities and a newfound consumerism. Needless to say, the transition to a market economy was a roller-coaster ride for many, and Central and Eastern European governments struggled to provide a wide array of social benefits to underpin the legitimacy of their new democratic regimes. After all, the transition to a market economy was literally a shot in the dark for all countries involved.
20 years later, the histories of Russia, China and most Central Asian republics are a bitter reminder that political freedoms, rule of law and competitive party systems should not be taken for granted as the natural outcome of the transition process. Even so, to casual observers, Central and Eastern European states seem to have reached the safe harbour of representative democracy. A closer look, however, raises an unsettling question: how solid are the foundations that these young democracies rest upon?
Eastern Europe’s economic vulnerability exposed
To survive, all political systems need some sort of legitimacy. The rules of the game established in Central and Eastern European countries (CEEs) – namely political freedoms, rule of law and competitive party systems – are a necessary condition for legitimacy. But they are not enough. To be legitimate, democratic regimes also need to provide what political scientists refer to as output legitimacy: the delivery of some sort of widely shared collective good. In our times, this collective good is generally understood as sustainable and equitable economic growth. Over the boom years of 2002-2007, all seemed well as Central and Eastern European economies rode the waves of easy global credit. The boom, however, came to an abrupt and painful end with the onset of the global financial crisis.
- Solidarnosc
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Supporters of the Polish opposition Solidarity, 1989
source: flickr,thomsson-
After the credit crunch and the subsequent economic crisis hit Eastern Europe, the hard-won political achievements were about to face their most serious test to date. While the main world economies responded to the crisis with large economic stimuli, the CEEs have had limited room for manoeuvre. With limited domestic capital and foreign exchange reserves, the most indebted economies, such as Hungary and Latvia had to walk the narrow walk set by the IMF, the European Commission and panicky investors. As a result, political stability is now threatened by collapsing currencies, drying up credit, shrinking output and rising unemployment. Since the region’s recovery is expected to lag behind that of the rich world, this threat – heretofore unrealized – will reach well into 2010.
Despite tentative signs of global economic recovery, the threat of political instability looms ahead in the Visegrád 4 as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary prepare for simultaneous elections. For these four countries, often treated as a coherent group of forerunners, this unprecedented congruence of elections may prove to be the ultimate test for democratic consolidation. In particular, three major challenges to political stability will manifest themselves: low electoral turnouts, political extremism and the post-election handover of power .
3 spectres hunting the East: apathy, radicalization and instability
Bar the founding elections of 1989-1990, absenteeism and political apathy have been hallmarks of Central and Eastern European elections. With a few exceptions, most parliamentary elections held in the Visegrád countries have had significantly lower turnouts than those in the established Western European democracies. Take Poland: in its most recent presidential and parliamentary elections, around half of all eligible voters stayed at home. European elections paint an even bleaker picture: new EU member states consistently bring the lowest popular turnouts, with official figures as low as 30% in some cases. This is a major blow to the legitimacy of the respective governments. Whatever the causes of absenteeism, the bottom-line is the same: Those who do not vote are not represented. The unrepresented have little stake in the regime’s survival and are thus more likely to support or condone extra-democratic, if not outright undemocratic forms of political action. If the social shock brought about by the economic crisis pushes already low turnout rates to abysmal levels, democratic reversal could follow. This brings us to the second potential source of political in the Visegrád 4.
- Magyar Garda
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Member of the Hungarian Guard, a paramilitary wing of the Hungarian extreme right, in front of the Parliament building at a far-right rally on 5 April 2009.
Source: flickr, habeebee-
Historically, radical ideas have gained the most appeal in difficult times. One of the tragedies of the Eastern European radical right is its ability to unite the general protest vote with the ideologically motivated one. Whether in the name of protecting minorities abroad (Hungary), defending the morality of public and private life as defined by its self-proclaimed preachers (Poland), exploiting historical grievances against its archenemy to suppress minority rights within its territory (Slovakia) or just vent popular anger against ethnic, religious or cultural minorities such as Gypsies and Jews (in virtually all countries), ideas of the radical right have had firm ideological roots ever since political liberalization liberalized hatred. What provides the perfect political opportunity for the radical right today beyond these old themes is its populism under an explicitly anti-capitalist veil. Portraying the often corrupt political establishment as traitors who are selling out to foreign multinationals and financiers, it serves as a natural choice for disappointed protest voters.
In practical matters, the rise of the radical right could be disastrous with regards to both European cohesion and democratic consolidation. Poisoned relations between prickly neighbours such as Slovakia and Hungary are often dismissed – rightly or wrongly – as local relics of a bitter past with no wider European consequences. However, when the radical right espouses euro-populism with an anti-capitalist rhetoric, the basic foundations of the “euro-consensus” that kept post-socialist countries on the path of democratic consolidation could be shaken. Of the 4 upcoming elections, the showing of the Hungarian and the Slovakian radicals is perhaps the single most indicative figure of the year to watch for. In the Czech political domain, the unreformed communists are likely to hold on to the protest vote as they have done so in most recent elections. A stronger showing of the hitherto weak radical right should not be ruled out, however. In the Polish presidential race, no radical candidate is likely to challenge the duel between the governing PO’s presumably moderate candidate and the current president, Lech Kacynski. That said, to what extent the latter candidate – widely known for his populist leanings – is able or willing to withstand the pressure to adopt some of the themes of the radical right is an open question.
- Road sign in Slovak and Hungarian
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The rights of the large Hungarian minority in Slovakia are still disputed.
source: flickr, Rich Gibson-
The third test for political stability in Eastern Europe will come on the day after the elections. One of the hallmarks of a consolidated democracy is the peaceful and uncontested handover of power, coupled with a moderation in the means to capture it. Contrast the Orange Revolution in Ukraine’s fledgling democracy with Al Gore’s gracious surrender in one of the most hotly contested elections in the history of modern democracies. Few would claim that the Visegrád countries risk a Ukraine-style stalemate. However, US-style power handovers seem even less likely. If the upcoming elections turn out to be tightly contested, the pressure on the loser will be immense. Teaming up with the radicals or adopting their themes in the pre-election period is one unwelcome option they could resort to. Crying foul and contesting the legitimacy of the official results is another. Recent past in Hungary has shown that even in good times masses could be mobilized to question official results without substantive evidence for electoral fraud. In times of crises, losers may feel even more tempted to bring their supporters on the streets. Post-election tension could also spark spontaneous riots that the crisis-struck countries of Eastern Europe – with the notable exception of Latvia – have largely avoided thus far.
No time for complacency
Some of these threats may sound exaggerated. Political apathy, after all, is not a peculiarity of Eastern Europe and may even be harmless in the short run. Radical breakthroughs are often ephemeral as dirty day-to-day politics and media focus reveal the radicals’ hypocrisy and incompetence. Solid constitutions should be well equipped to prevent contested elections from sparking lasting political impasse.
Nevertheless, for all those who truly appreciate the political heritage of 1989, this is no time for complacency. Central and Eastern Europe may face the greatest challenge in its young democratic history.
Photo: flickr, antaldaniel-
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