Mr Karimov held talks with EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, as well as with EU Energy Commissioner Gunther Öttinger. Unlike on most occasions, there was no media accreditation to cover these meetings, nor a joint press conference, most likely to spare Karimov any difficult questions. In a statement released shortly after the meeting, Barroso described the encounter as “extremely frank and open”. He also stressed that all of Europe’s key concerns, notably regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms, had been raised. According to Barroso, Karimov expressed his commitment to further deepen democratic reforms in Uzbekistan. The two sides signed a memorandum of understanding on energy cooperation and an agreement to establish an EU delegation in Uzbekistan’s capital Tashkent.

EU President Herman Van Rompuy and High Representative Catherine Ashton did not meet Karimov, unlike most heads of state who visit Brussels. Van Rompuy’s decision reportedly reflected his “moral, personal view.” Similarly, no official from the Belgian Foreign Ministry or the King met Karimov. The royal court cited “scheduling issues”, a code word for “unwelcome”, to justify the Belgian monarch’s inability to meet the Uzbek president.

Prisoners of the most cruel colony in Uzbekistan - Jaslyk

Source: flickr, UZNEWS.NET

Worst of the worst

Islam A. Karimov has been in office since his country became independent from the Soviet Union. Although nominally a democratic country, Karimov rules one of the most brutal regimes in the world. Uzbekistan consistently receives the lowest marks for political representation and civil liberties from civil society organisations across the globe. It has, for example, a guaranteed place in the list Worst of the Worst: the World’s Most Repressive Societies prepared every year by Freedom House. Human rights organisations like Human Rights Watch consider that torture and ill-treatment remain rampant. Amnesty International has continued to report harassment against human rights defenders and journalists. Craig Murray, former British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, pointed to reports of boiling political dissidents to death and estimated the number of political prisoners held in ex-Soviet gulags as around 10,000.

Uzbekistan is also infamous for its cotton industry, one of its main exports. As many as a million children are removed from education every year for one to three months to pick cotton by hand in dreadful conditions. Organisations such as Human Rights Watch have documented that government-sponsored forced child labour continued during the 2010 harvest season.

The massacre of Andizhan on May 2005, when security forces killed hundreds of unarmed demonstrators prompted a strong reaction from the international community. After what has been known as Uzbekistan’s Tiananmen Square, the EU imposed sanctions on the country in October 2005, specifically calling for an independent, international investigation into the events and for a concrete improvement in human rights. Although it would have been naïve to expect that imposing an arms embargo and travel bans on 12 Uzbek leaders would have altered the behaviour of such a brutal regime, the measures still held some symbolic value, especially for the families of the victims and people fighting to know the truth. However, despite continued concerns about human rights and nothing resembling an independent investigation having taken place, the EU decided to lift the sanctions in 2009.

Missing school to pick up cotton

Source: flickr, abbeyman2002

Critical or destructive engagement?

The European Commission regards the controversial visit of Karimov as part of a policy to strengthen relations with Central Asian countries in order to gain more influence in the region. Lifting the sanctions in 2009 was the starting point of this new EU Uzbekistan policy. “The European Union follows a policy of critical, conditional and comprehensive engagement with Uzbekistan,” said Barroso after his meeting with Karimov. “I believe it is through such a robust face-to-face dialogue, and not an “empty-chair” policy, that we can further the EU’s unanimously agreed policy of engagement most effectively.” Barroso argued that meeting Karimov gave him an opportunity to address the concerns of rights groups. EU officials considered that the Andizhan sanctions were ineffective as they only served to alienate the Uzbek government and “stood in the way of a constructive energy.” As an illustration of the success of this policy and the progress made by Uzbekistan, EU foreign ministers highlight the Uzbek government’s participation in a structured human rights dialogue with the EU.

Yet, human rights groups and other policy makers are not so convinced about the effectiveness of this new strategy. Cooperation and engagement as such are not the problem, but rather the lack of coherence and credibility of the EU’s approach to Uzbekistan and other authoritarian regimes.

The EU repeatedly stated that upgrading relations would be linked to concrete and measurable progress on human rights. The conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council of October 2010, for example, reiterated that “[the depth and quality of the cooperation and dialogue at all levels [between the EU and Uzbekistan] continue to depend on Uzbek reforms and progress in the areas mentioned above.->http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedo...]" However, the failure to demonstrate any concrete steps towards improving the human rights record of the country, in line with the criteria set by the EU in 2005 after Andizhan, did not translate into consequences in terms of policy – the so much trumpeted structured human rights dialogue is today little more than annual isolated talks with unclear objectives and outcomes. On the contrary, Karimov has been rewarded with an excellent photo opportunity to boost his legitimacy. Karimov’s pictures with Barroso and Rasmussen allow him to appear at home as a leader respected by the international community, while surely no reference to any of Barroso’s human rights remarks are to be found in Uzbekistan’s state-controlled media.

A policy of engagement which is not credible and coherent is not only ineffectual, but can actually be counterproductive and destructive. Lifting sanctions without an independent investigation of Andizhan and the presence of Karimov in Brussels will be interpreted as a de facto international rehabilitation for Uzbekistan. Moreover, according to David Nichols of Amnesty International, “the situation has got so bad that Uzbekistan now actually has said publicly that because the EU has dropped its sanctions there is no need to carry out an investigation, so it’s dropped.”

The timing of the visit could also not have been worse. While Karimov was visiting Brussels, and after he had paid a visit earlier in January to two other autocratic regimes in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, the EU was welcoming the fall of Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia and was preparing to reimpose sanctions on Alexander Lukashenko’s dictatorship in Belarus.

A crucial airbase for the war in Afghanistan

Source: flickr, Podknox

In 2008 the EU had lifted sanctions on Belarus to contribute to an apparently incipient liberalisation of the country. However, after Lukashenko ferociously repressed the protests that emerged after he won a fourth term in office, the EU imposed fresh sanctions on Lukashenko and his allies. While Lukashenko’s is certainly a terrible regime and sanctions are thus justified, Karimov’s Uzbekistan is a far more brutal dictatorship. This lack of coherence, one rule for Tashkent and one for Minsk, is difficult to justify and is a damaging illustration of the inconsistency of EU foreign policy.

Nabucco or the Taliban

EU officials often use the “risk of alienation” argument to defend their new policy of engagement in Central Asia. According to this logic, China and Russia reap the rewards of the rich natural resources of the region because they make no human rights demands. The possibility to opt for allies who ask no irritating questions would make the EU a far less attractive partner and render its isolation policy ineffectual. The EU would have had thus few choices, apart from adapting this strategy, in order to play the Great Game in Central Asia. The EU’s flagship energy project, the Nabucco pipeline, bringing natural gas from Azerbaijan and other countries around the Caspian Sea to Europe, would be thus the strong impetus behind this new EU policy for Central Asia.

Uzbekistan, however, presents no noticeable trade concessions to be gained by the EU. Although its estimated gas reserves are larger than Azerbaijan’s, the country’s energy resources are mostly contracted to Russia and it would take decades before it could start delivering significant amounts of energy to the EU. “If you’re going to sell your soul, you should at least get a good price,“said Andrew Stroehlein of the International Crisis Group in an exquisite exercise of Brussels cynicism.”There’s absolutely nothing to gain for the EU [in Uzbekistan]. It’s incomprehensible." Why bother inviting an unpleasant visitor who does not even bring a nice bottle of wine?

Yet, Uzbekistan is strategically important for the war in Afghanistan. In 2009 the military alliance signed a treaty with Tashkent about the transit of nonlethal equipment through the country. Today around twenty per cent of supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan go through Uzbekistan. As NATO’s Secretary General Anders F. Rasmussen put it, it is natural to meet with the leader of one of the alliance’s partner countries. But this should hardly be a reason weighty enough for the EU to meet Karimov. Germany’s airbase in Uzbekistan, however, might be. When Uzbekistan encouraged the US to abandon its own base in the country after strong American criticism over Andizhan, Tashkent sent a clear warning to Berlin. This explains to a great extent Germany’s constant support for Uzbekistan ever since, going against some of its European partners and its universal values.

Propaganda for Karimov

Source: flickr, SMAC: ScribeMedia Arts & Culture Channel

What foreign policy for the EU?

At a moment when it is trying to develop a serious foreign policy and is having problems adapting to the winds of change blowing throughout the Arab world, the EU cannot afford to appear to be having cosy and uncritical relations with Uzbekistan. A real “critical engagement” with a sustained policy follow-up of the most pressing human rights issues, especially at the highest level and including EU Member States bilateral relations, is needed if the EU is to be taken as a credible international actor. In this sense, the future EU delegation in Tashkent can offer an extremely useful instrument to the EU, provided that it has at its disposal the required resources and human rights expertise.

However, in its current form, the EU strategy of “critical engagement” will hardly bring about any major human rights improvements in Uzbekistan. Karimov will continue to show his skills in playing to the EU. He will accept an annual disagreeable diplomatic exercise in the form of structured human rights dialogue and maybe some cosmetic reforms. And this will be sufficient to content the EU. This scenario would send the message around the world that the EU is not serious about human rights and democracy. And this is a message the EU can ill-afford to send.

Photo source: EC Audiovisual service, EC