European Defence and the Treaty of Lisbon

European Defence and the Treaty of Lisbon – What now ?

17 novembre 2009 | Par Armand STEINMEYER 3

The main changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and the next steps to be taken by the EU

Now that the Treaty of Lisbon has crossed its final Czech hurdle, we can finally contemplate the future of the EU with its new set of guiding rules. Brussels and various commentators have been buzzing with excitement about the prospects of the creation of a European presidency with an enhanced executive role that will ultimately embody the EU’s face to the world. Falling hand-in-hand with talk of the European presidency and European international clout is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP also appears to have been one of the major beneficiaries of the Treaty with the creation of the post of High Representative for foreign affairs to present a common position on EU policies. So then why European defence ? European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been one of the fastest growing sectors of the EU in the 21st Century. Since 2002 the EU has participated in 19 missions across three continents with the most robust missions to date being the most recent ones. With steady progress throughout the last ten years, how will the Treaty of Lisbon affect the ESDP and has it given European defence a clear direction ?

One Step Forward and One Step Back

We can call the changes brought about in the Treaty of Lisbon as an extremely cautious step forward. Firstly, the ESDP will now be renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) highlighting the EU’s nominal commitment to greater integration. This is reflected in the treaty itself which states that the CSDP will include the “progressive framing of a common Union defence policy” that “will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides.” (ToL, Article 28a, paragraph 2). In essence, this phrase states that the formulation of a coherent defence policy is a clear objective, when every member state has agreed to put it in motion.

Common defence

The incorporation of mutual defence into the Treaty of Lisbon signifies a major step forward in itself.

Photo : European Commission

The inclusion of a mutual defence clause within the Treaty of Lisbon can also be considered to be a major development in common European defence initiatives. Member states, in case of armed aggression on their territory, are held to provide “aid and assistance by all means in their power” (ToL, Article 28a, paragraph 7). The incorporation of mutual defence into the Treaty of Lisbon signifies a major step forward in itself. However, the inclusion of an ‘opt-out’ clause stating that the article “shall not prejudice” individual defence policies essentially empties the article of concrete meaning. Finally, the Treaty also enshrines the role of NATO as the foundation for collective defence of states that are members to both NATO and the EU. It would seem that for all major developments in the Treaty is a clause attached stating its requirements for future approval.

Ideas in Progress

Nevertheless, it would be unfair to castigate the progress made by the Treaty without highlighting some important legalistic and structural changes which at first may appear banal. What may appear as the first sign of a significant change is the expansion of the tasks assigned to CSDP. The inclusion of “peace-making” and the support of “third countries in combating terrorism in their territories” (ToL, Article 28b, Paragraph 1), offers tools required for the development of a European defence policy with a greater focus on EU strategic interests. Going beyond the previous Petersberg Tasks (peace-keeping, humanitarian and rescue) the EU is given the legal means for more robust operations. This change effectively allows greater flexibility when dealing with perceived threats and a common response to them.

Lisbon Treaty Referendum Campaign

The Treaty introduces some important legalistic and structural changes which at first may appear banal

Photo : Flickr, Informatique

The most important structural reform of the Treaty is the establishment of ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ (ToL, Article 28a, paragraph 6). This confirms a firm move towards the institutionalisation of a common defence policy. This structure will bring together the states that have fulfilled their military commitments to the EU and can operate without the participation of a fixed number of participating states. Operating under qualified majority voting, the structure allows states at the forefront of CSDP to pursue greater harmonisation of their defence apparatus along the lines of a ‘two-speed’ Europe. Pierre Lellouche, defence spokesman for UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire) describes the participant states as a ‘pioneer’ group that other states can join after fulfilling the agreed criteria.

So Where Do We Stand ?

Despite some of the major advances that have been described in the article, the Treaty has not answered some of the more fundamental questions which are filled with controversy. For example, the development of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ fails to delineate any concrete measures of harmonisation and does not go beyond calls for greater integration. Individual member states are left with strong powers to override any major push towards integration and perhaps rightly so.

Should I stay or should I go ?

The progress which has been described is not irrelevant but lacks direction at this stage.

Photo : Flickr, Rockcohen

The central issue to European defence today is largely an issue of definition. Before any progress is made, a shared definition of EU strategic interests has to be agreed on. Pierre Henri d’Argenson, writing for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, argues that CSDP will soon confront a threshold where controversial decisions will have to be made. Among these decisions is whether the EU wishes to become, in the words of d’Argenson, “a subcontractor or an actor in its own right for international security or making ESDP the instrument of the global strategic interests of the EU ”. So then where do we stand ? The difficult questions which have been asked about the direction of European defence have remained unanswered whilst appeasing both those who want greater integration and those who want to maintain strict independence in the realm of defence. The progress which has been described is not irrelevant but lacks direction at this stage.

The next steps should clearly work on this aspect. To do so would require the development a new European Security Strategy to provide the framework for the new tools that are now available for policymakers. Secondly, the odd position of EU non-NATO members and NATO non-EU members must be clarified to remove one of the most outstanding issues. With over 5,000 troops deployed abroad and a growing international profile, it would seem that European defence policy is enjoying sunny days. However, important questions on the future of European defence remain unanswered and the Treaty of Lisbon has not given us an answer to them.

Logo : Flickr, Pierre Holtz

Recommander cet article

reagir Imprimer envoyer par mail Auteurs

Dossier spécial

L’Europe du Traité de Lisbonne

1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |> |...

Le mystère des eurodéputés fantômes

Initiative citoyenne : sachons raison garder

Le 8 juillet, l’UE aura-t-elle un Service diplomatique ?

Errances et dénouements de la première présidence sous Lisbonne

Espace réactions (3)

Ajouter un commentaire

Siobhán Gabriella Gibney
18 novembre 2009
10:11

European Defence and the Treaty of Lisbon – What now ?

The ability of member states to opt out of a potential mutual defence clause most certainly does not ’empty the article of concrete meaning’. Non-aligned states such as Ireland define themselves by their neutrality (though it’s of course compromised from time to time - see the use of Irish airports during the Iraq war), and to condition a mutual defence pact on all member states joining would be to destroy it before the debate begins. Many of the most important symbolic and practical functions of the EU are subject to individual opt-outs (ie. the common currency). This does not deem the project meaningless or irrelevant - not by any means. The fact is, when you have 27 member states with varied perspectives on history, you have to account for some unshakeable differences. If the possibility of an opt out not been included in the allowance for a potential mutual defence clause, the Irish would have never ratified, and the Austrians and Swedes might not have either. Finally, note all the ’possiblity’ and ’potential’ - the Lisbon Treaty does not create binding mutual defence - it just makes it possible in the future, same way it makes it possible for member states to leave the EU.

Réagir à ce commentaire

Benoît
27 novembre 2009
11:11

European Defence and the Treaty of Lisbon – What now ?

Totally agree with your comment Siobhan. Without any possibility of an opt-out, the EU and more especially ESDP (where sovereignty matters so much) would never move forward and would always be bound to lowest-common denominator decisions, even more so than today. The permanent structured cooperation created by the Lisbon Treaty follows this reasoning of letting a few member states leading the way in CSDP with the other member states being able to either tag along or stay out of it.

(Other evidence of Ireland not being so neutral : Irish Lieutenant General Pat Nash was the commander of ESDP mission EUFOR Tchad-RDC between October 2007 and March 2009).

Booth
28 août 2011
17:33

European Defence and the Treaty of Lisbon – What now ?

Commandant Éditez, je vous souhaite une bonne réussite.

Paris en ligne

utiliser des bonus sur les sites de paris sportifs autorisé en france afin de parier en ligne.

Réagir à ce commentaire

Ajouter un commentaire

European construction

Czech Senate gives green light to the Treaty of Lisbon

Daniel Gros: ‘Let a euro-zone member go bankrupt’

Lisbon Treaty

Ashton in the spotlight

This article examines some of the criticisms that have been made against Ashton in her short time in office.

External Action Service: where are we?

Auteurs

Armand STEINMEYER

Voir cet auteur

Armand is an MSc student in Conflict Studies at the London School of Economics (LSE). His international experience growing up in Indonesia, Thailand, France and Britain has contributed to his interest in working with Europe’s position in the (...)