What Embargo ?

Most agree the EU arms embargo is largely symbolic and has had no real implications on the Chinese armament drive. Although China would undoubtedly welcome technology transfers from advanced European weapons systems, it has shown that it can modernize its military without any such help. Indeed, China procures most of its arms technology from Russia and has in recent years made substantial efforts to ‘indigenize’ Russian weapons systems -evidenced by the development of Shenyang J-11 fighters from the Sukhoi-27 mold- both to become more self-sufficient as well as to create a domestic arms industry in order to sell weapons technology to other countries. China’s fairly recent acquisition of Sovremenny class destroyers with SSN-22 anti-ship cruise missiles and K-28 anti-submarine warfare helicopters from Russia indicate that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is content in seeking Moscow’s help to develop its air and sea capabilities in order to balance its traditional role as a land-power.

Adherence to the embargo in the EU has also been sporadic at best. Major European players such as France, according to data collected by leading arms and military think-tank SIPRI, continue to largely ignore the sanctions. According to the trend-indicator provided by SIPRI, French arms sales to China in 1994 even climbed to 90 million U.S. dollars from 74 million U.S. dollars in 1989 (millions of US$ expressed in constant (1990) prices). Moreover, in the period 1989 - 2004 France accounted for 73.2% of total EU arms sales to China. Indeed, annual data shows that France never interrupted its sales to China despite the existence of the embargo, which leads to the question of who in the EU is for the embargo and who isn’t.

Divided Camp

The embargo’s original intentions remain clear. It was a message to Beijing that human rights abuses by China will be met with international sanctions. However, twenty years later, the EU is now divided over whether the embargo is still relevant in that capacity or merely a relic of an age gone past.

Does the embargo have a real purpose today ? Certainly, it seems that the last thing Beijing would consider when confronted with human rights issues is whether Europe will further ‘sanction’ its arms dealings with China. This is precisely the renewed argument that has sparked in Europe with some contending that the embargo is outdated and useless while others insisting that it should remain for principle’s sake. Those who have shown willingness to further discuss the lifting of the embargo include countries such as France, Spain, Greece, Malta, Romania and Bulgaria while the U.K. and Germany have come down strictly against any further action.

Interestingly, embargo discussions have also been used by some states as a tool to curry favour from China. In 2004 for example, during a state visit to China, former French President Jacques Chirac expressed that the embargo was outdated and ‘no longer corresponds with the political reality of the contemporary world’. Further expressing that he was in favour of lifting the embargo but that London and Washington were strictly against this. In the end, nothing came of this diplomatic foray as it buckled under American pressure.

Now that the rotating EU presidency has reached Spain, key Spanish figures such as Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos have displayed a willingness to reverse the sanctions. While this caught some commentators off-guard it would seem that contemplating this move was the next logical step after a series of attempts to deepen EU-Chinese cooperation. We remember that in 2007, the 1985 EU-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement was upgraded to a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. And just last year, a Chinese delegation met with EU Commission representatives to sign agreements covering issues ranging from Intellectual Property Rights to Labour economic issues. Seen in this light, for the future of EU-China relations, it is indeed an incoherent message if China is included in a short list of embargoed ‘rogue states’ while being sought as an economic and strategic partner.

Triangular Relationship

Washington’s stance is clear : it opposes the lifting of the arms embargo. One of the past reasons given was that any arms transfers would potentially destabilize the fragile situation in the South China Seas. With the sale of US$ 6.4 billion worth of arms to Taiwan, it has not only shown that it is willing to act in its own interest but that it is willing to take calculated risks in doing so. For U.S.-China relations however, the row over Taiwan is an ongoing one and to suggest that the fundamental cooperation between two nations whose economies are so interlinked to have spawned terms such as ‘Chinamerica’ is going to be significantly derailed by these arms sales are absurd.

Hence, concerns that the lifting of the embargo could tip the military balance of power decidedly in China’s favour and endanger cross-strait affairs due to some sort of PLA military action is not foreseeable. Indeed, China seems to have found a more effective means to ‘sway’ the Taiwanese public’s favour. By showing that it can maintain a ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy, Beijing hopes it can use Hong Kong’s continued economic vigor as bait to reel Taiwan in.

Framing the Argument

To China, the embargo serves as an embarrassing stain on its relations with the EU. An emerging superpower with a mid-level power chip on its shoulder, the CCP has always striven for more international respect and a level playing field. In this vein, Premier Wen Jiabao expressed during the recent China-EU summit that only the lifting of the arms embargo and the granting of market economy status (MES) by the EU could move diplomatic relations forward. During the November 2009 EU-China Forum in Beijing, Premier Wen even agreed not to buy arms from EU countries when the embargo is lifted. This is a clear indication that China views the embargo as having no real implications but rather wants it lifted in order to look to the decades ahead without worrying about the burdens of the past.

Chinese PM Wen Jiabao has agreed not to buy arms from EU countries when the embargo is lifted.

Photo : Flickr/ World Economic Forum

This episode comes at the cusp of a new Chinese foreign policy era, an era where in recent years China has been more determined than ever to define itself as a strong and independent power. Acquiring massive energy assets, investing in foreign countries and successfully stemming the damage caused by the World Financial Crisis with a gargantuan domestic capital injection, China has acquired renewed confidence in itself. Showing an appreciation for its market potential and accompanying political status in the world, it is now more willing than ever to flex its political muscles on the world stage. Whether for better or worse, this general attitude has been on display as of late in both Copenhagen and Davos. Just recently, on a visit by the Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper to China in December 2009, his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao scolded him for not having visited sooner, saying that ‘five years [without high-level visits] is truly too long for Sino-Canadian relations’, causing some embarrassment to the Canadian delegation. This sort of Father-to-Son ‘reprimand’ attitude would have been unfathomable just decades earlier, when China, a relative mid-level power, would have been glad for any sort of amicable diplomatic relations with the West. Indeed, China’s slow return to great-power status will lead to re-calibrations of many diplomatic relationships, including on the China-Europe axis.

When it comes to the embargo, Beijing’s confident swagger has been on full display, with one senior Chinese official even having been quoted as speculating that the arms embargo will prevent Europe from buying advanced Chinese weapons systems in the future. Given this attitude and a self-assured belief that this is China’s decade, it is hardly surprising that the leadership in Beijing is calling for the unconditional ending of what it deems as insulting and outdated sanctions.

In the Final Analysis

While it is true that China’s human rights record is far from perfect, it is hard to see what a twenty year old arms embargo could do to remedy Beijing’s conduct in that sphere. As observed, having no real implications on Chinese arms advancement, the embargo only serves as a barrier and hindrance to further EU-Chinese cooperation. With Beijing so confident in its economy, foreign policy and riding high on a largely loyal populous that thrives on a ‘them versus us’ mentality, it’s difficult to fathom that the arms sanctions could serve any positive purpose for the EU.

Most agree that it is absolutely pertinent that the EU continue to encourage China to step up its human-rights record. It should remind China that with Great-Power status come Great-Power responsibilites and it should therefore step up to the plate on issues such as climate change, responsible arms sales and peacekeeping. But, in the present era of Chinese confidence, is a drawn-out argument over an archaeic treaty that has long been discredited and circumvented really progressing any of these debates ?

In the end, any prolonged argument about the embargo will only benefit China’s internal political situation. The CCP has often sought external factors in mobilizing national sentiment against the ‘West’ and using it as a rallying force for its domestic policies. With the robust economy quickly replacing communist doctrine as the true legitimizing force in Beijing and China striving to return to double-digit GDP growth, embargo dialogue that would allow the Chinese government to re-awaken a ‘victim mentality’ among the people in order to unite the populace and deflect criticism over recent corruption scandals would even be welcome.

Photo : Flickr/ QXZ

Why the EU should’t lift the arms embargo on China