Ireland and referendums
Ireland has a history of inviting its citizens to approve or disapprove of international treaties that will affect the constitution in the form of national referendums. While it’s widely believed that this is mandated by the constitution, it is in fact a matter of precedence rather than legal obligation. Nevertheless, it is consistently applied, and the case of EU

- All major political parties publicly supported the Lisbon Treaty.
Photo : Flickr/ infomatique
treaties is no exception. Ireland joined the EU (then EEC) in 1973, with 59% citizen approval. Voter turnout was considerably high, with only 29% abstaining. By the next EU treaty referendum, participation had dropped to below the 50% mark, but approval remained clear. In 2001, the Irish rejected an EU treaty for the first time. The document in question, namely the Nice Treaty, was adjusted to exclude Ireland from potential common defence arrangements, and was approved in a second referendum. In addition to its precedence of holding referendums, Ireland appears to be developing a precedence of repeating referendums if the first outcome is not the desired one.
The first attempt
The first Lisbon Treaty referendum was held in June 2008. Around 53% of eligible voters turned out to the polls, 28% of which voted no, meaning the Treaty failed to gain approval. The entire process was poorly handled by an over-confident Irish government who seemingly believed if they told the citizens to vote yes, they would do so without question. All major political parties supported the Treaty, so in the absence of serious political competition, politicians were largely complacent in convincing the public that it was indeed a good document.

- Some no campaigners used fear tactics, giving false information to potential voters.
Photo : Flickr/ infomatique
The no campaign was largely bank-rolled by Declan Ganley, a wealthy Irish businessman who is suspiciously quiet about where exactly his wealth comes from. Minor political party Sinn Fein, historically associated with the IRA, also took a stance against the treaty. Some no campaigners spread lies and misinformation, telling citizens that a yes vote meant they’d be drafted into a European Army (a non-existent entity). In the face of strong, albeit rather extremist opposition, the Irish government and supporting parties failed to present a convincing argument.
They were given little help from the EU institutions, and lost significant legitimacy when their own Commissioner assured the public that he had neither read the text, nor did he expect any ‘sane or sensible’ person to do so. In some peculiar way, Commissioner Charlie McCreevy apparently thought this information would encourage citizens to follow his advice and vote yes.
The majority of citizens who abstained did so because they lacked understanding of the Treaty. More alarming is the fact that the majority of citizens who voted no also claimed to have little or no understanding of the issues at hand. Many citizens who supported the Treaty did so based on their general approval of the EU, rather than their impressions of the document itself. In a testament to the success of no campaigners, only 37% of citizens were aware that the Lisbon Treaty would not introduce conscription into a European army, while almost one third of citizens were certain it would.
Saved by the crisis
A year and a half, some minor adjustments to the Treaty, and an intense debate about the principle of democracy later, the referendum was held again. This time, voter turnout increased by 5%, but the yes vote increased from 46.6% of votes to 67.7% of votes. Surveys suggest the majority of those who voiced approval in the first referendum retained their position in the second vote, with 1% of the original supporters switching to the no side, but 7% abstaining. Increased support for the Treaty came largely from no voters changing their mind the second time around, and from former abstainers appearing at the polls to vote yes.

- 46.6% of voters supported the Treaty in the first referendum.
Photo : Flickr/ infomatique
However, Irish and EU officials can hold off on congratulating themselves on this newfound Irish approval for the Treaty. Rather than suggesting that the Irish government and EU institutions learned a lesson from the first referendum and ran a much more effective and convincing campaign, it seems the Lisbon Treaty was saved by the economic and financial crisis. Ireland was hit particularly badly by the crisis, so it’s not surprising that 23% of yes voters supported the Treaty because they thought it would help the Irish economy (as opposed to 9% in the first referendum).
While abstentions dropped 7%, the percentage of citizens who felt uninformed about the content of the Treaty only dropped 5%, leaving a third of Irish citizens still feeling they are not informed on the Lisbon Treaty. Interestingly, in the second referendum, the most popular reason for abstaining was because the concerned citizens were either too busy or had more important things to do. The Irish government and EU representatives may have provided more information ahead of the second referendum, but evidently they failed to impress upon the people the significance of the Lisbon Treaty, or at least the significance of expressing an opinion about this document.
Lessons to be learned
Irish and European officials may forget the Lisbon Treaty referendums quickly. As far as some are concerned, the Treaty has been ratified, so it is time to focus on implementation, they may think. Of course, this process will take a lot of time and energy and should be done in the most effective and fair way possible. However, to forget the referendum fiasco would also be an injustice. The Lisbon Treaty referendums were a public relations disaster for the EU and most Irish political parties. Not only was the Irish government embarrassed, but also all other political parties who put their support behind the Treaty.

- 53.4% of voters rejected the Treaty in the first referendum.
Photo : Flickr/ infomatique
Political leaders in Ireland and the EU were complacent and presumptuous about the will of the Irish people. Irish leaders apparently presumed that with their vocal support for the Treaty, it would pass without problems. EU institutions also have no excuse for laying idle. It’s not as if officials were distracted by a series of referendums going on in various member states. This was the only state they had to focus their attention on as far as Lisbon Treaty information campaigns and promotion are concerned. In a demographically and geographically small state such as Ireland, this should not have been an insurmountable task.
The political image of Ireland and the EU was tarnished by the first referendum, but even more so by the decision to hold a second referendum on the same topic. The EU is a relatively undemocratic entity, and the fact that when people are given a vote they are asked to try again after providing the ‘wrong’ answer makes a mockery of the Irish referendum tradition. At the same time, it would have been absurd to prevent much-needed reforms and developments to EU structures because most of the Irish who bothered to vote either didn’t know what the Treaty was actually about, or thought it would lead to conscription to a non-existent European Army, or some other untruth.
The Lisbon Treaty vitally reforms and further develops the European Union. In this sense, European citizens will benefit from its ratification. However, the image of the EU, its value of democracy, and the impression of citizens that they have a say in the European project has been severely harmed. Irish political leaders and EU officials alike must learn from this double referendum. They must learn to better inform, engage, and consult their citizens, before the EU grows irreversibly out of reach of the citizens it is intended to serve.
Headline Photo : EU Commission Audiovisual Service/ The Treaty of Lisbon


Newsletter
Euros du Village
Gli Euros
Die Euros
The Euros
Los Euros
Ajouter un commentaire
Ajouter un commentaire
Die Iren und der Vertrag von Lissabon – Gründe für den Meinungswandel

(26)